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way. This is especially important in view of the fact that contracts
now exist wherein the parties probably thought they were establish-
ing servitudes of right of way when merely creating other rights
which do not come under that classification.
To state here that a contract creating such a right of way should
be governed by the title of the Civil Code concerning conventional
obligations " or that it should be governed by one of the titles on
particular types of contract such as lease"0 or sale"' would be pure
speculation. However, it should be noted that when the court or
the legislature does make a specific legal classification of this private
right of way, important policy considerations will be involved, not
the least of which will be the question as to what prescriptive period
will best serve the state's economic and general needs.
JOHN C. CAMP
ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVITUDES BY DESTINATION
Art. 767. The destination made by the owner is equivalent
to title with respect to continuous apparent servitudes.
By destination is meant the relation established between
two immovables by the owner of both, which would constitute
a servitude if the two immovables belonged to different
owners.
1
Art. 768. Such intention is never presumed till it has been
proved that both estates, now divided, have belonged to the
same owner, and that it was by him that the things have been
placed in the situation from which the servitudes result.2
Art. 769. If the owner of two estates, between which there
exists an apparent sign of servitude, sell one of those, and if the
deed of sale be silent respecting the servitude, the same shall
continue to exist actively or passively in favor of or upon the
estate which has been sold.'
For the establishment of servitudes, Article 767 provides that the
destination made by the owner is equivalent to a title when a con-
29. Arts. 1761-2291, La. Civil Code of 1870.
30. Arts. 2668-2777, La. Civil Code of 1870.
31. Arts. 2438-2659, La. Civil Code of 1870.




tinuous and apparent servitude is involved. Thus, if the owner of
two immovables has established a relationship of service between
these properties, which would constitute a continuous and apparent
servitude if the two properties belonged to different owners, a
predial servitude comes into existence when the ownership is later
divided.
The preceding Article 766' provides that "... discontinuous
servitudes, whether apparent or not, can be established only by
title. . .
A problem arises, however, upon reaching Article 769. Imme-
diately there emerges a discrepancy in the two articles although they
are found in the same section of the code and purport to deal with
the same subject. Under Article 769 the servitude would come into
existence if there is merely an apparent sign of servitude, without
regard to whether it is continuous or not. Can these two articles be
reconciled? Does one control, modify or exclude the other or is
there an interpretation by which this seeming discrepancy may be
clarified? For the purposes of this comment, servitudes will be
considered in their classifications of continuous or discontinuous,'
and of apparent or non-apparent,6 without individual discussion as
to respective classifications.
I
The present text of Article 767 is the continuation of its prede-
cessors in the Civil Code of 1825' and in the Code of 1808.8 The
French text of this article in both our earlier codes is exactly the
same as Article 692 of the French Civil Code.' Likewise, the pro-
visions of Article 769 are found in both of our earlier codes,' with
the same French text as Article 694 of the French Civil Code." The
same may be said of Article 768 of our code.'2  Consequently,
there is justification in seeking enlightenment from the French
commentators.
4.. Ibid.
5. See Art. 727, La. Civil Code of 1870, for definitions and. illustrations.
6. See Art. 782, La. Civil Code of 1870, for definitions and illustrations.
7. Art. 763, La. Civil Code of 1825.
8. Art. 55, p. 138, La. Civil Code of 1808.
9. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 3 La. Legal Archives
435 (1942).
10. Art. 765, La. Civil Code of 1825; Art. 57, p. 143, La. Civil Code of 1808.
11. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 3 La. Legal Archives
435 (1942).
12. Art. 764, La. Civil Code of 1825; Art. 56, p. 138, La. Civil Code of 1808;




Five possible theories have been advanced by the French com-
mentators in attempting to find a solution to this problem. All of
these theories are set out by Aubry et Rau as follows :"3
1-Article 6941" [Article 7691 is applicable only to continuous
apparent servitudes because it is merely complementary to Articles
6921s [Article 767] and 69316 [Article 768] .
2-Article 694 explains Article 692; therefore, the requisites
are met in all cases if the servitude is apparent." I
3-the distinction lies in the fact that Article 694 refers to
cases where the owner disposes1" of one of the estates, while Articles
692 and 693 refer only to the situation where the division was
brought about by a partition."
4-Article 694 applies only to reviving a servitude which had
been extinguished by confusion, whereas Articles 692 and 693 refer
to establishing a servitude for the first time.2
5-Article 694 means that when the servitude is apparent, even
though discontinuous, there is a presumption that the parties
intended the relation of service to remain; ,but in such a situation
this presumption must be supplemented by a showing that there is
no convention to the contrary in the act by which the properties
were separated. However, by dealing with the situation under
Article 692 when the servitude is both continuous and apparent,
there is no need to establish the absence of a contrary stipulation in
the act of separation.22
The French writers have offered serious objections to each and
every one of these theories. It is claimed that the first and second
theories are equally untenable since each would place all the em-
13. 8 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Francais (5 ed. 1900) 148, § 252,
no 9.
14. Art. 769, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Art. 767, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. Art. 768, La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. 1 Delvincourt, Cours de Code Civil (1834) 417-418; 2 Maleville, Analyse
Raisonn~e de la Discussion du Code Civil (1805) 146.
18. Contra: 12 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoleon, 2 Trait6 des Servitudes
ou Services Fonciers (1876) 818, § 818.
19. "Df8posW" has been translated "sell" in the corresponding English text
of Art. 765, La. Civil Code of 1825, which has been combined into Art. 769,
La. Civil Code of 1870. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of La., 3 La. Legal
Archives 436 (1942).
20. 8 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Francais (2 ed. 1876) 228, § 189.
21. 2 Marcad6, Explication Thorique et Pratique du Code Civil (1886)
640-646.
22. 3 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 13, at 149-150.
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phasis on one article causing the complete suppression of'the other.
The redactors could not have intended that either of two articles so
closely related should nullify the other.
The third theory of interpretation has also been subjected to the
severe criticism that it draws exaggerated effects from the French
word "dispose," which was evidently used by the French legislators
merely to express the idea of division of two estates as an aftermath
of any juridical act.
Although the fourth theory represents an explanation which
was given during the legislative debates on the Code Napoleon-
that both articles were necessary to overcome the difficulties found
in the ancient law- 23 the objection has been raised that Article 694
is completely foreign to and makes no mention of reviving a servi-
tude. It has also been suggested that there is no reasonable basis
for providing a different, and perhaps easier, method to revive a
servitude than to establish one.
Likewise, the fifth interpretation has been criticized because
there is nothing in the articles with regard to the question of burden
of proof or the burden of negativing the presence of a contrary stip-
ulation in the act of separation.
II
Each of these methods of attempting to recohcile Articles 767
and 768 with Article 769 of the Louisiana Civil Code would be open
to the very same kind of objections and criticisms. It might be
noted that the fourth theory is eliminated altogether because the
Louisiana Civil Code has a'n additional -provision in Article 812
which is not found in the French Civil Code. In the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825, Article 8082" was added under the section on how
servitudes are extinguished, and it provides that only a continuous
and apparent servitude may be revived by destination. No device
of statutory interpretation can produce the conclusion that Article
769 revived by destination a servitude which is merely apparent
23. 11 Fenet, Recuel Complet des Travaux Preparatiores du Code Civil
(1836) 327-328.
24. Art. 812, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Except in the cases herein mentioned,
and similar cases, servitudes extinguished by confusion do not revive, except
by a new contract; with the exception of continuous and apparent servitudes,
with respect to which the disposition made by the owner of both estates is
equivalent to title."
25. Compiled Ed. of the Civil Codes of La., 3 La. Legal Archives 458 (1942).
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when this is directly inconsistent with the specific provisions of
another article of the code.
Thus, with only the fourth theory absolutely untenable, any of
the remaining four theories, although subject to some criticism,
might have been adopted by the Louisiana courts. But the Louisiana
jurisprudence has failed to yield a single case in which the court
openly recognized and discussed the conflict in these provisions of
the code. Furthermore, the cases have not been unvacillating.
Between 1825 and 1870 the term "perpetual" is used in a
number of cases instead of "continuous." This is undoubtedly the
result of the translation of the French "continues" as "perpetual"
in the English text of Article 76326 of the Code of 1825 [Article
7671 .27 But there is no indication that the legislature intended any
different meaning because the definitional Article 723 of the Civil
Code of 1825 substituted the word "continuous" for the word "per-
petual" in the Civil Code of 1808 which had described "perpetual"
exactly the same as "continuous" was defined in the French Civil
Code and is defined now in the Code of 1870: ". . . those whose
use is or may be continual without the act of man.""8 However,
the court has placed a somewhat different interpretation upon the
term "perpetual." In one case,29 the Louisiana court cited Toullier
as authority for the proposition that "perpetual" referred to the
intention of the owner of the two estates to allow the relationship
of service to remain indefinitely. However, a close examination of
the writings of the French commentator cited in that case reveals
that the requirement of "caract~re de perpetuitY" Was not intended
to have any bearing on whether the use of the servitude might be
continual without the act of man.8"
One of the early Louisiana cases on the subject was Barton v.
Kirkman."l The plaintiff sought recognition and enforcement of a
servitude of passage (which is discontinuous). The defendant
vendor had boarded up a door which gave access to a yard upon
which plaintiff claimed the servitude. Plaintiff asserted that there
was a servitude in his favor by reason of the fact that the defendant
26. Art. 767, La. Civil Code of 1870.
27. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 3 La. Legal Archives
435 (1942).
28. Id. at 417.
29. Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407, 408 (1846).
30. 2 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Francais (1848) 283.
31. 5 Rob. 16 (La. 1843).
Accord: Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407, 408 (1846) ; Rozier v. Maginnis,
12 La. Ann. 108 (1857). See Gottschalk v. De Santos, 12 La. Ann. 473, 474 (1857).
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had at one time owried both properties. Without discussing whether
the servitude was continuous or perpetual the court concluded it
was "clear that the servitude is within the provisions of Articles 763
and 76432 [Articles 767 and 768 of the Civil Code of 18701, and that
the defendant, by whom it was established, has now no power to
destroy it. The use, says the law, which the owner has intentionally
established on a particular part of his property in favor of another
part, is equal to title, with respect to perpetual and apparent
servitudes thereon."
A few years later, the court decided, in Durel v. Boisblanc, s
that the servitude of passage was apparent and therefore 'stablished
by destination, although certain other servitudes involving a well
and a privy had not the permanence and "caractbre de perpetuit"
which the law requires for establishments by destination.
The most interesting opinion during this period was handed
down in 1852 in the case of Fisk v. Haber wherein Justice Rost said:
"It may be observed that the servitude of passage claimed, is not a
continuous servitude, and could, under no circumstances result from
destination of the pere de famille."34
To add to the confusion, the court indicated by way of dictum
in Gottschalk v. De Santos' 5 -decided just five years after Fisk v.
Haber"-that a servitude of passage might be established by destina-
tion. Then in 1860, three years after the Gottschalk case,37 the case
of Cleris v. Tieman'8 the supreme court reverted to the Fisk v.
Haber doctrine.
These cases show the inconsistent treatment during this period
which the court had accorded to the problem of establishing a servi-
tude by destination. There appears to be no basis on which these
contradictory decisions can be reconciled.
After 1870, the word "perpetual" was dropped from the civil
code, and the court has followed a much more consistent pattern.
In fact the cases during this later period have been decided entirely
32. Arts. 767 and 768, La. Civil Code of 1870.
33. Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407 (1846); Rozier v. Maginnis, 12 La.
Ann. 108 (1857).
34. 7 La. Ann. 652 (1852) (Italics supplied.). Accord: Cleris v. Tieman,
15 La. Ann. 316 (1860).
35. 12 La. Ann. 473, 474 (1857). Accord. Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407
(1846); Barton v. Kirkman, 5 Rob. 16 (La. 1848); Rozier v. Maginnis, 12 La.
Ann. 108 (1857).
36. See note 3, supra.
37. See note 35, supra.
38. Cleris v. Tieman, 15 La. Ann. 316 (1860).
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and exclusively on the basis of Article 767." Article 769 is some-
times cited,4" noticeably in cases which deal with servitudes which
happen to be both continuous and apparent, but it never constitutes
a determining factor. Even more important in cases in which the
servitude is discontinuous, there is little attention devoted to explain-
ing that servitudes must be continuous and apparent in order to be
established by destination; the court merely states that discontinuous
servitudes, whether apparent or not, can be established only by title.4 '
In spite of the fact that the earlier cases to the contrary have
not been expressly overruled, it seems safe to conclude that, without
much discussion of the conflict in the articles, the Louisiana courts
have finally settled on the first of the five theories of the French
commentators. The result is that our Article 769 is unnecessary and
meaningless-in all cases the servitude must be continuous and
apparent in order to be established or revived by destination.
ALVIN B. GIBSON
EFFECT OF PAYMENT OF WAGES AFTER DISABILITY
AS A CREDIT TOWARD WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
In interpreting the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act,'
the courts have concluded that an eniployee may be totally and
permanently disabled if he cannot do work of the same character
that he was performing prior to the accident.' The fact that he may
be able to perform the same work with pain' or through assistance4
39. Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1888); Woodcock v. Baldwin,
51 La. Ann. 989 (1899); Capo v. ]3lanchard, 1 La. App. 3 (1924); Giarratano
v. Angermeier, 7 La. App. 375 (1927); Kelly v. Peppitone, 12 La. App. 635,
126 So. 79 (1930); Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 141 So. 67 (1932).
40. Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1883); Woodcock v. Baldwin,
51 La. Ann. 989 (1899).
41. Capo v. Blanchard, 1 La. App. 3 (1924); Giarratano v. Angermeier, 7
La. App. 315 (1927); Kelly v. Peppitone, 12 La. App. 635, 126 So. 79 (1930);
Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 141 So. 67 (1932).
1. La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-44321.
2. Black v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 161 La. 889, 109 So. 538 (1926);
Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932); Stieffel v.
Valentine Sugars Co., 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938).
3. Stieffel v. Valentine Sugars Co., 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938); Hingle
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 30 So. (2d) 281 (La. App. 1947).
4. Norwood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil Co., 145 La. 823, 83 So. 25 (1918); Hulo
v. City of New Iberia, 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923); Carlino v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
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